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Active Bar Membership October 15, 2007
Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Critique of the
"Active" Bar Membership Regulation
By David J. Agatstein*
* The author is a Social Security Administrative Law Judge in Pasadena,
California, and was founding editor of J NAALJ. He is a retired member of the
New York State bar, a judicial member of the Virginia bar, and a named plaintiff in
AALJ v. OPM, Dist Ct. D.C., Case No. 07-0711 (RMC). The views expressed in
these pages are his alone, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Social
Security Administration, the AALJ, the NAALJ, or anyone other than the author
himself. The author is alone responsible for all errors in the article and Appendix.
This article relies heavily on previously unpublished material. Many people
contributed information and advice, and some devoted significant time and labor
researching and responding to my incessant inquiries. It would be impractical to
acknowledge all of the contributors by name, but they all have my sincerest thanks
and my assurance that I know who they are. (Individuals who are quoted in the
article or Appendix are identified by name wherever possible; comments on the
NPRM, however, were provided to me with the names redacted.) Accordingly,
begging the pardon of my un-named contributors and co-authors, I offer particular
thanks for the extensive help and guidance provided by the following: the
Association of Administrative Law Judges (AALJ) and its President, Judge Ronald
Bemoski (for permission to use material previously restricted to members of AALJ,
and for many other courtesies); Hon. Philip J. Simon (who inspired the project and
provided guidance throughout); Hon. William A. Wenzel (who drafted the AALJ's
monumental and exhaustive response to the NPRM); Professor Gregory L. Ogden
and the editorial board of J. NAALJ; Hon. John D. Moreen; Hon. John Geb; and
my ever supportive wife, Jeannie Agatstein.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Should a lawyer maintain active bar membership after
appointment to the bench? When asked this question, some
administrative law judges answered with a resounding "yes", on
grounds of professionalism. Others, however, responded with an
equally resounding "no", on precisely the same grounds.
The difference of opinion stems from the fact that state laws
differ,' not only in their details, but in their conceptual framework as
well. The correct answer is either "yes" or "no" depending on the
state in which the judge is licensed.
Whether a judge should be required to maintain any particular bar
status by an OPM Regulation however, is an entirely different
question. The Regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(b) provides as follows:
2
1. Because there is no single publicly available source of information
regarding the bar status rules applicable to ALJs in the various states, I have
attempted a preliminary compilation (see Appendix).
2. The NPRM, Examining Systems and Programs for Specified Positions and
Examinations (Miscellaneous), is published at 70 Fed. Reg. 73646 (Dec. 13, 2005)
and republished at 70 Fed. Reg. 75745 (Dec. 21, 2005). The final rule, unchanged
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Licensure. At the time of application and any new
appointment and while serving as an administrative
law judge, the individual must possess a professional
license to practice law and be authorized to practice
law under the laws of a State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any
territorial court established under the United States
Constitution. Judicial status is acceptable in lieu of
"active" status in States that prohibit sitting judges
from maintaining "active" status to practice law.
Being in "good standing" is also acceptable in lieu of
"active" status in States where the licensing authority
considers "good standing" as having a current license
to practice law.3
This article will address the Regulation insofar as it applies to
sitting administrative law judges.4 It will consider in detail the rule,
the exceptions, and the underlying OPM policy. The article will
attempt to demonstrate that the Regulation, when considered in
context, adversely affects the interests of all ALJs, whatever their
jurisdiction of licensure.5
from the NPRM, is published at 72 Fed. Reg. 12947, 12955 (Mar. 20, 2007). With
respect to the first exception, note that a state that merely prohibits its judges from
practicing law, but does not prohibit a judge from voluntarily electing "active"
status, does not fall within the literal language of the Regulation. The meaning of
the "good standing" exception is also far from clear.
3. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (Mar. 20, 2007).
4. The article does not address the bar status prerequisite for ALJ applicants.
However, it should be noted that the present ALJ corps includes a number of
former trial and appellate judges, some of whom, in accordance with the custom of
their respective states, relinquished their active status when they were first elevated
to the bench; at the time they applied for the ALJ position they had not been active
for many years. The Regulation discussed below is clearly absurd if applied to
them.
5. I will discuss only the licensure requirement, but other provisions of the
Regulation are far from benign. As FORUM pointed out in its January 4, 2006
comment on the NPRM, the Regulation drastically alters existing qualifications for
appointment. The Regulation eliminates the open competitive examination
requirement in [the existing rule] and the detailed description of the basic
qualifications for ALJ applicants and the ALJ examination and scoring procedures
contained in [the current rules. . . . The preamble states] that OPM intends to
The article will proceed as follows. First, it will attempt to
reduce misunderstanding by providing a brief history of the divergent
methods by which the legal profession is governed in America. It
will then argue, in the text or in the footnotes, 6 that the Regulation
violates fundamental principles of administrative and Constitutional
law, undermines judicial independence, and is invalid for at least
eight reasons: ultra vires, procedural due process, substantive due
process, federalism, vagueness, irrationality, APA compliance and
arbitrariness. Because OPM has minimized or ignored these
concerns in promulgating the final rule, the article will conclude by
urging a judicial remedy.
II. BENCH AND BAR
Writing in 1768, William Blackstone observed that:
attorneys are now formed into a regular corps; they
are admitted to the execution of their office by the
superior courts of Westminster Hall; and are in all
points officers of the respective courts in which they
are admitted .... No man can practice as an attorney
in any of those courts, but such as is admitted and
7sworn an attorney of that particular court...
Across the Atlantic, in the American colonies, it was more
difficult to identify a "regular corps" of attorneys. As one authority
include a description of ALJ qualifications and the ALJ examination process and
criteria in a vacancy announcement. The substantive details of the basic
appointment and examination criteria that would be included in such a vacancy
announcement would be changeable at will without notice and comment by the
public. Continued inclusion of the ALJ qualification and examination procedures
in the ALJ regulations is necessary to ensure public confidence in the appointment
of a decisionally independent administrative law judiciary.
6. The more technical arguments are discussed only in the footnotes:
vagueness (see infra note 71), APA Compliance (see infra note 42) and substantive
due process (see infra note 60). The placement is based upon stylistic and not legal
considerations, and does not imply that the arguments are any less weighty than
those covered in the text.
7. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 26
(1768).
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put it, "anyone could be a lawyer who could use a set of legal forms
and maintain a position in argument."8 By the time of the American
Revolution, however, courts of general jurisdiction had control over
the right of lawyers to appear before them on behalf of clients.9
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789
disturbed this arrangement.' 0
As the country expanded, new methods were thought necessary
to control access to the legal profession. In the late nineteenth
century, during a flood of occupational licensing laws that swept up
physicians, embalmers, and street peddlers," four states created
boards of bar examiners to license prospective attorneys. 12 Today, in
every state, a license is the usual prerequisite for admission to the bar
and the practice of law.
The first bar associations in the United States 3 were the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1870) and the
American Bar Association (1878). Their stated purposes were to
promote the public interest. Membership in these organizations and
many others that followed was entirely consensual.
In 1913 the American Judicature Society, at the urging of its
Executive Secretary Herbert Harley, endorsed the concept of an
"integrated bar."'14 As described by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
integrated bar is "an association of attorneys in which membership
and dues are required as a condition of practicing law [in a State]."' 5
8. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING,
855 (2d ed. 1994).
9. Id. at 866.
10. Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License. Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 527, 529 (2000).
11. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 397 (1973).
12. JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
293 (2001).
13. They were preceded by, e.g., the English Incorporated Law Society. 2
JUNE BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 486 (1988).
14. Theodore J. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J., 9 n.45 (1983).
15. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), citing Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
It combines the ideas of private association and state regulation' 6 -
not unlike the organization of the bar of the future Soviet Union.' 7
Nevertheless, the idea took hold: today, thirty-two states have
integrated (i.e. mandatory'8) bars.' 9
The bars of states that are not mandatory are "voluntary", which
simply means that there is no required state bar organization. In
order to practice law in a "voluntary" state one must be licensed to do
so, and, in addition, usually must be admitted to the bar of one or
more of the courts before whom one wishes to practice (as in
Blackstone's England).
By the late twentieth century, several voluntary states
"nonetheless achieved centralized funding and control over lawyer
discipline through registration systems. Those typically require that
all lawyers in a state register annually with the state's supreme court
and pay a registration fee.",20
The bar status of judges does not necessarily depend on whether
the state bar is mandatory or voluntary. In some states (partially as a
result of the OPM Regulation 21) the status of judges--especially
16. As a legal entity, the integrated bar is "sui geneirs." Anne E. Melley, AM.
JUR. 2D, Attorneys at Law, § 7 (2007); see also Brotsky v. State Bar of Cal., 57 Cal.
2d 287 (1962).
17. l imply no slam of mandatory bars; I simply point out the historical irony.
See 1 KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI & VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, GOVERNMENT, LAW AND
COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 560 (F.A. Praeger ed.,
Atlantic Books 1959).
18. In some states the integrated bar is called a "unified bar", presumably
because the term "integrated" has civil rights connotations. Theodore J. Schneyer,
The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J., 9 n.45 (1983).
The term "unified bar" can be misleading, however; in Harley's day it referred to
the fact that, in America, solicitors and barristers constituted one profession.
JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 482 (1904). Moreover, a small
but persistent source of confusion arises from the fact that, in some states, the
mandatory bar organization is called the "state bar"; in others it is called the "state
bar association". Obviously, membership in a private bar association (national,
state, local or specialized-the ABA or, for that matter, the NAALJ) confers no
right to practice law in any state.
19. See Appendix.
20. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 38 (1986).
21. The Civil Service Commission, first created in 1871, was dismantled by
Congress in 1978 and its functions were divided between two new agencies: the
Merit Systems Protection Board and the Office of Personnel Management.
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federal judges and most particularly ALJs-is unsettled. The
situation is complicated, and the complications bear heavily on the
issues of diversity and federalism raised by the OPM Regulation, as
the following discussion will demonstrate.
III. THE ARGUMENT
A. The Regulation is Ultra Vires
In response to the notice of the proposed rule making ("NPRM")
one commentator stated:
While there is little doubt that OPM has statutory
authority 'to establish standards with respect to
citizenship [etc.] which applicants must meet to be
admitted to or rated in examinations' (5 U.S.C. 3105),
including ALJ examinations, there is nothing in the
Administrative Procedure Act conferring jurisdiction
on OPM to set qualifications for ALJs (specifically,
bar membership qualifications) after they have been
hired by their respective agencies. It appears to me
that this responsibility is vested in the employing
agencies themselves, to be exercised in accordance
with the different needs of their various subject matter
jurisdictions. The NPRM relies on the 'clear intent of
Congress' as the basis for this seemingly novel
assertion of regulatory authority, but there is nothing I
can find in the legislative history of the APA (Act of
June 11, 1946) expressing this intent, which,
apparently, has been less than clear for more than half
CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 119 (1997). Adjudication
was assigned to the MSPB; OPM was given the authority to write and grade civil
service examinations. At one time OPM, recognizing its special obligation under
the Administrative Procedure Act to assure the independence of ALJs, maintained
an Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ), which for some years was headed
by an ALJ. When the political tides shifted, however, OALJ was abolished and its
functions were downgraded and merged into the general civil service pool. Since
then, OPM has consistently ignored calls to reinstate OALJ. See, e.g., Letter of
Administrative Law Judge Coordinating Council to Linda M. Springer (April 11,
2006) (on file with author).
a century. Would you please cite more specific legal
authority to demonstrate that this proposed regulation,
and concomitant reversal of OPM policy, is not ultra
vires?
In the final rule,2 2  OPM acknowledges that "many
commentators" challenged its authority to extend its jurisdiction over
sitting ALJs but, not surprisingly, promulgates the rule anyway.
Abandoning its reliance on the "clear intent of Congress", OPM cites
various cases to prove that it has authority to establish examination
criteria for initial appointment to the position of ALJ-a fact that was
never in dispute-but (again not surprisingly, in view of the state of
the law) it cites no precedent in support of the expansion of its
power.23  Indeed, the attempt to find statutory authorization for
regulating the bar status of sitting judges would invite unflattering
metaphors. As the D.C. Court of Appeals stated in American Bar
Ass 'n v. FTC, dealing with an analogous attempt by a federal agency
to assert regulatory authority over the practice of law, "[t]o find this
interpretation deference worthy, we would have to conclude that
Congress ... had hidden a rather large elephant in a rather obscure
mouse hole ....
Accordingly, in lieu of any relevant legal authority, the final rule
asserts that "this is not a new requirement but a clarification of a
longstanding OPM policy that an administrative law judge must have
an 'active' bar membership or current license to practice law."25
There are many problems with this assertion. First, of course,
OPM cannot have a "policy" without the express statutory authority
to regulate the issue.26 OPM is not the judge of its own subject
22. Office of Personnel Management, 72 F.L.R.A. No. 53, 12947 (March 20,
2007).
23. The APA specifically requires that the NPRM "give the legal authority for
the rule." CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.6 (1997),
citing Attorney General's Manual. Failure to cite the law is in itself a failure of
notice. Id.
24. Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cf United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
25. Office of Personnel Management, 72 F.L.R.A. No. 53, 12950 (March 20,
2007).
26. This is, of course, black letter law. See, e.g., CHARLES KOCH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.22 (1997).
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matter jurisdiction, and its interpretation as to the extent of its power
is entitled to no special weight.27 As John Hart Ely famously noted,
"public persons know that one of the surest ways to acquire power is
to assert it." 28 Unfortunately for OPM, however, an agency cannot
expand its jurisdiction by adverse possession.2 9 This is particularly
true where, as here, the OPM Regulation has the practical effect of
encroaching on discretionary areas reserved to the states,30 and
interfering with the right and duty of other federal agencies with
respect to the status qualifications of their own employees.
Secondly, the allegation of "a longstanding OPM policy" is
simply untrue. This is a serious charge to bring against a federal
agency but the following discussion will prove it in some detail. The
proof will demonstrate, not only the malafides of the Regulation, but
its underlying flaws and deficiencies.
OPM POLICY
Prior to 1998, OPM's public statements not only lacked any
expression of a policy favoring "active" bar membership; they were
27. Although the general "question of whether Chevron applies to
interpretations of the scope of an agency's 'jurisdiction' is somewhat unsettled",
(DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2005-
2006 64 n.33 (Jeffrey Lubbers ed., ABA 2006)) and the Circuits are in conflict,
where, as here, the statute is unambiguous, the question simply does not arise. The
Federal Bar Association, in its February 13, 2006 comments on the proposed rule,
and other commentators, made the point that OPM has a duty to perform the
regulatory activities mandated by statue, rather than discretion to do so.
28. JOHN HEART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (Harvard Univ. Press
1980), reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG & HYMAN GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 316
(1995).
29. See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FTC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (a
federal agency "literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress confers
power upon it").
30. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986). Although the OPM Regulation does not require state bar licensing
agencies to define active status in a manner that will accommodate ALJs, the
practical effect of the regulation will be to "dragoon" state bars into doing so. Cf
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), see also Oregon v. Ashcrof, 368 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 2004). The Regulation has already caused considerable confusion in
many state bars, as did the AGC opinion letters hereinafter described.
inconsistent with the existence of such policy.3 Indeed, overlooking
the limitations of OPM's jurisdiction, the ALJ community generally
believed that, if OPM did have a policy, it was that continued bar
membership was not required.3 2
On July 28, 1998, however, Rhoda G. Lawrence, an Assistant
General Counsel for OPM, wrote a letter to Stuart Besser of SSA's
Office of General Counsel. Mr. Besser had apparently asked OPM
whether "Administrative Law Judges and Federal Government
attorneys are required to maintain active state bar memberships,"
31. The Comment submitted by the AALJ in response to the NPRM addresses
this point in some detail (see generally the Comment submitted by the AALJ 11-
13), but a few additional observations may be in order. In May 1989, OPM issued
an "Administrative Law Judge Program Handbook" in which it explained the
duties and responsibilities of both ALJs and OPM. The Handbook suggests no
duty on the part of any ALJ to maintain any particular post-employment status, but
claims for OPM the duty to maintain "liaison with professional bar associations to
help recruit and retain well-qualified applicants and to encourage high standards of
conduct and performance among Administrative Law Judges." (OPM's methods of
"encouragement" and its right to undertake such "encouragement" are the topics
under discussion here.)
In August 1994 OPM signed off on a revised Administrative Law Judge
Position Description describing the duties and responsibilities of ALJs in great
detail, but making no reference to any post-employment obligations imposed by
OPM, with respect to bar status or any other issue. In May of the same year SSA
issued an "ALJ Administrative Handbook" which states that retired ALJs who
wish to participate in SSA's "Senior ALJ Program" must maintain "a current
license to practice law" (i.e., an SSA, not an OPM policy, applicable only to
retirees who wished to reenter service) but imposing no such requirement on sitting
ALJs. To the contrary, the Administrative Handbook referred to the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that a "judge shall not practice law."
32. In January 1989, four months prior to publication the Program Handbook,
James R. Rucker, Jr., Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security
Administration, by far the nation's largest employer of ALJs issued a memorandum
to all SSA ALJs setting forth his understanding of the issue: "The Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) does not require continued Bar membership once
an individual is appointed to the ALJ position . . ." OPM never contradicted that
statement, possibly because Judge Rucker erroneously assumed that OPM had
statutory authority to impose such requirement if it chose to do so. Whatever
OPM's motive, the statement was never retracted by either Judge Rucker or SSA.
OPM's new Qualification Standard for Administrative Law Judge Positions, May
2, 2007, states that "[i]ncumbent ALJs must continue to meet" the pre-employment
licensure requirement. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Qualification
Standard For Administrative Law Judge Positions,
https://www.opm.gov/qualifications/alj/alj.asp.
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thereby lumping them together in the same category. 33 There is, of
course, no way for us to know what discussions preceded this
inquiry. Instead of replying, as would have been appropriate, that the
issue was onstitutionally reserved for consideration by the various
state licensing authorities; that, in any event, the professional fitness
of ALJs employed by SSA was for SSA, not OPM, to determine; and
that OPM had no authority to express a legal opinion on the issue;
Ms. Lawrence wrote the following:
[Attorneys must] maintain good standing. This means
that an attorney's membership in the bar must be such
as to permit the attorney to practice law, whether or
not it involves maintaining an 'active' status. We are
aware of no jurisdiction in which an 'active' member
is not regarded as authorized to practice law.
Therefore, as a practical matter, OPM has advised
agencies that their attorneys must maintain 'active'
status. Attorneys who wish to maintain a status other
than 'active' may do so, provided that the status they
maintain entitles them to practice law. This would
apply to such categories as 'judicial' or 'active non-
resident' to give two examples that have been brought
to our attention. . . . Administrative law Judges
(ALJs) must meet the same professional licensing
requirements as GS-905 attorneys....
As Ms. Lawrence's reference to "judicial" status, and a status
"other than active" makes clear, OPM was not of the view that a
status "such as to permit the attorney to practice law" meant that an
ALJ needed to maintain a status that would permit the ALJ to
practice law immediately, without further action on the part of the
ALJ. The letter could only be read as meaning that the ALJ was
qualified to practice law upon the performance of certain ministerial
33. As Judge Wenzel points out in commenting on a draft of this article, "the
underlying structural fault in OPM's approach to ALJ issues is that.. . OPM does
not have [a separate] occupational title or series for administrative law judges."
34. E-mail from Rhonda G. Lawrence, Assistant General Counsel for OPM,
to Stuart Besser, of SSA's Office of General Counsel (July 28, 1998) (on file with
author).
acts within the ALJ's immediate control (electing active status,
paying bar dues). It implies that the ALJ has not been disbarred or
convicted of a crime. In short, her attempt to define the term not
withstanding, the letter appears to mean that the ALJ satisfies Ms.
Lawrence's fundamental requirement if the ALJ is in "good
standing" with a state bar.35
While Ms. Lawrence's letter expressly denied that "active" bar
status was the only status acceptable to OPM, it was extremely vague
as to what statuses other than "judicial" or "active non-resident"
would qualify.36 Accordingly, in my then capacity as an officer of
the AALJ, I wrote to her for clarification. Her response, dated
January 7, 1999, was unhelpful:
OPM recognizes that, as state bars create new bar
membership classes, questions may arise whether
membership in a particular class qualifies an
individual to serve as an ALJ or attorney. As noted in
my earlier letter, the burden is on the employee to
show to his/her employing agency that a status other
than "active" entitles that employee to serve as an ALJ
or attorney.37
In other words: OPM requires a particular status, but will not say
what status is acceptable and what status is not. In fact, OPM will
not even decide the issue if it is presented (the issue is for the
"employing agency", rather than OPM or the state bar licensing
authorities). And, although OPM cannot state what it means by a
status that "permits the [ALJ] to practice law", the burden is on the
35. Ms. Lawrence illustrates a point once made by John Austin: "Terms that
are largest, and therefore the simplest of a series, are without equivalent
expressions into which we can resolve them concisely. And when we endeavor to
define them, or translate them into terms which we suppose are better understood,
we are forced upon awkward and tedious circumlocutions." John Austin, The
Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture 1 (1832).
36. E-mail from Rhonda G. Lawrence, Assistant General Counsel for OPM,
to Stuart Besser, of SSA's Office of General Counsel (July 28, 1998) (on file with
author).
37. E-mail from Rhonda G. Lawrence, Assistant General Counsel for OPM,
to David J. Agatstein (Jan. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
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ALJ to persuade his or her employing agency that he or she occupies
that status.
Confused by this response, I wrote to Ms. Lawrence once again,
asking for additional clarification. The reply came from her
successor, Assistant General Counsel James F. Hicks. By letter dated
February 11, 1999, Mr. Hicks stated, inter alia, that OPM "has not
undertaken the task of a State-by-State survey of bar membership
requirements and restrictions, nor does it intend to do so" and politely
suggested that I direct any further inquiries elsewhere.38
The vague, contradictory, confused and confessedly un-
researched opinions of two OPM Assistant General Counsel,
however, do not establish OPM "policy", long standing or otherwise.
Thus, in May 2000, the Director of OPM, Armando Rodriguez, sent
the following email to Administrative Law Judge Bruce Birchman:
"You are correct in that we do not require active bar membership for
ALJs. The requirement applies to applicants and Senior ALJs. I
believe I know where this came from and it was in error." 39
A draft memorandum from R. Christina Espinosa-Ross, Deputy
Director of OPM's Office of Administrative Law Judges, dated July
12, 2000, expresses a similar view.
The issue, however, had escaped into the air, and was not laid to
rest by Mr. Rodriguez' communication. In August 2001, Jane E.
Altenhofen, Inspector General for the NLRB, detected the existence
of an OPM "policy," namely:
that ALJs must be both licensed and authorized to
practice law. The policy is based on two opinion
letters issued by OPM's Office of General Counsel.
Reliance on these opinion letters is problematic for
two reasons. First, the courts have stated that such
agency interpretations lack the force of law and do not
warrant the same deference as formal rule making and
actual adjudication. Second, there is no express
directive in the current OPM Regulations requiring
sitting ALJs to be active members of a bar, while there
38. E-mail from James F. Hicks, Assistant General Counsel for OPM,
to David J. Agatstein (Feb. 11, 1999) (on file with author).
39. E-mail from Armando Rodriguez, the Director of OPM, to Judge
Bruce Birchman (May 2000) (on file with author).
are regulations [that] require active membership of
ALJ applicants and retired ALJs who are recalled to
Federal service.4 °
In December, 2005, OPM finally settled on a "long standing"
policy. Obviously recognizing that opinion letters have, at best, an in
terrorem effect, 4' and desiring to clear up the muddle created by its
earlier pronouncements, OPM issued a NPRM.
The final regulation was promulgated fifteen months later, on
March 20, 2007.42 Notwithstanding the history just described, the
40. Opinion letter from Jane E. Altenhofen, Inspector General for the
NLRB (Aug. 2001) (on file with author).
41. Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Bowler v. Hawke, 320
F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2002).
42. APA Violation. Adoption of the Regulation also violated the
Administrative Procedure Act. The Association of Adriinistrative Law Judges
filed an exhaustive comment on the proposed regulation, drafted by Judges Larry J.
Butler and William A. Wenzel. The AALJ cited Meeker v. OPM, DC-300A-98-
0467-2 (1998), in which an attorney employed by OPM applied to be placed on
the ALJ register. OPM denied the application on the grounds that Meeker had not
maintained "active" status as a licensed attorney for the seven year period
immediately prior to his application. An ALJ for the M.S.B.P. concluded,
however, that OPM violated its own rules in not having documented that the
"active bar membership" requirement was based on a job analysis and shown to
have a rational relationship to job performance. The AALJ pointed out that the bar
status regulation is similarly unsupported. In response to this comment, the final
rule mentions, for the first time, studies by "OPM's Research Psychologists" who
concluded that "Integrity/Honesty is fundamental for performing the duties of an
administrative law judge." These studies, however, were directed to the pre-
employment qualifications of prospective ALJs and, accordingly, have nothing to
do with the issue at hand. (I am sure that all would agree that ALJs-and
regulators as well-should be honest.)
Referring to the psychological studies, the AALJ noted in its subsequent
District Court Complaint challenging the regulation, AALJ v. OPM, Dist Ct. D.C.,
Case No. 07-0711 (RMC), that OPM attempted to rely upon material that was not
included in the NPRM, and upon which the public had no opportunity to comment.
More tellingly, OPM may have attempted to avoid notice entirely, by publishing
the Regulation under the obscure and uninformative title Examining Systems and
Programs for Specific Positions and Examinations (Miscellaneous). See CHARLES
KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4.4, 4.6 (1997). More tellingly
still, in the face of the many defects identified by the public in response to the
NPRM, OPM promulgated the final regulation without changing a single word of
the licensure provision. From these facts, an impartial observer may decide
whether OPM complied with the notice and comment provisions of the
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final rule states that, because "it is not a new requirement, a transition
period is not needed."43  Indeed, the Regulation is offered as a
"condition of employment" thereby ostensibly allowing OPM to
remove non-compliant ALJs without the procedural safeguards
contained in the APA.4 The Regulation does not say whether this
"condition of employment" is a new requirement or not.
B. The Regulation Violates Due Process
EXCEPTIONS TO ACTIVE STATUS
Not surprisingly, many highly critical comments were submitted
to OPM in response to the NPRM. 45 With respect to the "judicial
exception" one commentator wrote:
The words "in States that prohibit sitting judges from
maintaining 'active' status to practice law" should be
omitted, and additional clarification added, so that the
sentence reads, in substance, "Judicial status is
acceptable in lieu of 'active' status, in states that
accord judicial status to ALJs." It is not necessary
that a state prohibit a judge from maintaining active
status, because most full time judges (and all federal
ALJs) are prohibited from practicing law in any event,
and, more importantly, because judicial status means
that the individual is within the ambit of the state's
licensing authority. Indeed, the ethical standards for
judges are, if anything, higher and more exacting than
those for attorneys. Accordingly, the interests of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554. Compliance requires that the
government consider the comments with an open mind and modify its proposed
regulation accordingly. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers v.
FCC, 502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974); KoCH § 4.15.
43. Office of Personnel Management, 72 F.L.R.A. No. 53, 12949 (March 20,
2007).
44. Final Rule 930.21 l(C)(1) purports to exempt OPM actions from 5 U.S.C.
§ 7521; cf Perry v. Sinderman 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
45. The comments are summarized in the final rule. OPM has provided this
writer with copies of the public comments, but not the comments submitted by
other agencies, claiming an exemption under FOIA.
federal government in maintaining professional
standards for ALJs, as embodied by the proposed
OPM Regulation, are fully satisfied-indeed, better
satisfied-by judicial rather than active status.46
The same commentator suggested that the Regulation be clarified
to make it explicit that one may be in "good standing"
with the bar while in "inactive" status .... An ALJ
who has been disbarred, or who has surrendered a law
license in lieu of disbarment, is not in good standing,
and, in addition, is not subject to further direct bar
discipline. An "inactive" bar member is nevertheless a
member of the bar, and may be disbarred for, e.g.,
47
unauthorized practice....
Both of these arguments were rejected by OPM on the grounds
that they do not promote "the efficiency of the competitive
service, ' '48 without further explanation. I would contend,49 by
contrast, that the arguments, although eloquently presented, are
mistaken for different reasons entirely. First, they are parochial; they
assume, for example, that the licensing state has both "active" and
"inactive" categories, and that the licensing state does not consider
judging to be the practice of law.5 °
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
46. In this regard, I note that because the requirements for "active" status
are addressed to the tensions that arise in the practice of law, and because ALJs do
not practice law, the requirement for "active" status is a poor proxy for ALJ-
specific professional standards, such as a Model Code of ALJ Conduct.
47. On this issue, another commentator cited Matter of Maroney, 259 A.D.2d
206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
48. Office of Personnel Management, 72 F.L.R.A. No. 53, 12949 (March 20,
2007).
49. Although my personal involvement in the events described ends at this
point, in order to present my arguments simply and clearly I will continue to use
the first person singular.
50. See Tennessee rule, supra; cf Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30 (1936).
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In addition, and much more fundamentally, the comments imply
that it would be unobjectionable for OPM to require that ALJs be
within the jurisdiction of state disciplinary boards. However, even
states that consider judges to be active bar members are careful to
remove them from the disciplinary purview of the practicing bar. For
OPM to impose bar status requirements that are inconsistent with the
regulatory framework laid out by the individual states, by requiring
ALJs to have a current license to practice law without regard to the
safeguards of judicial independence embodied in the state's law,
OPM violates one of the most basic tenets of due process-that no
person be a judge in his or her own case. 51 This becomes obvious
when one considers the origin and purpose of the Due Process
Clause, as explained in the following paragraphs.
If the OPM Regulation were given its intended reading and
effect, ALJs, as active bar members in states where that classification
is not intended for judges, would face the possibility of discipline by
tribunals established, consisting or controlled by the professional
organizations that represent the lawyers who practice before ALJs.
This was the precise issue confronted and condemned by Sir Edward
Coke in Dr. Bonham 's Case52-a leading authority and still very
much a part of American Constitutional law.53 Although the courts
have "generally . . . agreed that . .. a sitting judge cannot be
disbarred for a violation of the prohibition [against practicing law]
since to allow a disbarment would be effectively to confer on the bar
51. In other words, due process requires that ALJs be independent of the bar.
ALJ independence also protects the role of the Article III judiciary. As Peter H.
Russell states in his essay, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence,
"one way of undermining judicial independence is to transfer judicial functions
from a judiciary enjoying a high degree of autonomy to officials and agencies
having very little independence." PETER H. RUSSELL, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, in PETER H. RUSSELL & DAVID M. OBRIEN,
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
FROM AROUND THE WORLD 8-9 (Univ. Press of Virginia, 2001). This provides at
least a partial answer to Professor Moliterno's article, The Administrative
Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, reprinted in 27
J.NAALJ 53 (2007).
52. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 652 (1610).
53. JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 18 (2003).
association the power of removal."54 This same position is given its
fullest implementation in cases such as In Re Meraux,S where the
regulation exposes ALJs to the potential necessity of defending
against that charge or other charges that may be brought before bar
disciplinary committees.
Accordingly, one contemporary authority on legal ethics,
discussing lawyer discipline in general, noted that lawyer
registrations systems (described supra p. 45) include disciplinary
structures that hold "the promise of greater independence from the
state bar"; nevertheless, "in operation most courts in registration
states give the state bar association a strong role in selection of the
members for disciplinary agencies" 5 6 and other related powers. If, as
the author of this quotation implies, the due process issue is troubling
in the case of lawyers disciplining lawyers (because of the tribunal's
presumed lack of impartiality), the problem is much worse in the case
of lawyers disciplining judges. 57 For this reason, the ABA Model
Rules for Lawyer Discipline5 8 exempt judges from the jurisdiction of
lawyer disciplinary agencies. Apparently for this reason as well a
number of federal district court judges have exempted themselves
from membership in the state's mandatory bar.59
54. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Validity and Application of State Statute
Prohibiting Judge From Practicing Law, 17 A.L.R.4th 829 (2006) (citing State Bar
v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 207 Cal. 323 (1929), and Re Silkman, 88 App.
Div. 102 (1903)).
55. In re Meraux, 202 La. 736 (1943); see also Re Jones, 202 La. 798 (1943);
both cited in 57 A.L.R.3d. 1150.
56. CHARLES W.WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1986).
57. Viewed from this perspective, the holding of the District Court in Meza v.
Massanai, 199 F.R.D. 573 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (that an ALJ's inactive bar status in
California did not deprive the claimant of due process) was correct, but for reasons
that the court did not mention, namely, that inactive bar status was entirely
appropriate. Cf. State Bar v. Superior Court of L.A., 207 Cal. 323 (1929), infra
note 54. I would contend, given the state of California law, that inactive status is
constitutionally mandated. A similar point was made by the Energy Bar
Association in its February 2, 2006 comment on the proposed rule.
58. Rule 6C. Rules adopted by ABA House of Delegates August 11, 1993,
and amended thereafter.
59. It has been difficult to document this reasoning. For example, while a
number of federal district court judges in the Eastern District of North Carolina did
decide that they were not required to belong to that state's mandatory bar, and
resigned from the bar, their reasoning has not been made available. Chief United
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To restate this point, the licensing of attorneys is a state function.
If a state requires a judge to assume a bar status inconsistent with
judicial independence, the judge must opt out, on federal
Constitutional grounds. A federal regulation that requires a federal
ALJ to assume an inappropriate state bar status-even if the state
agrees to confer the status-is two steps removed from Constitutional
validity. This would be true even if the regulation had a statutory
foundation. 60
C. The Regulation is Inconsistent with Federalism
As the Supreme Court has noted: "[s]ince the founding of the
Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left
exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their
respective jurisdictions." 6' As recently as 2002, the American Bar
Association rejected a proposal that there be a single, nationally
States District Court Judge Louise W. Flanagan, in a letter to author, dated August
9, 2007, states that she consulted with her colleagues and, "[a]s with me, a myriad
of considerations [bearing on the issue] revealed themselves." While Judge
Flanagan did not identify any of the considerations, she did not deny the
suggestion, contained in my letter of inquiry, that it included procedural due
process. Similarly, District Court Judge Alex R. Munson of the Northern Mariana
Islands informed me, through his law clerk, that he had been advised to go inactive
or resign from the bar when he was appointed to the bench (see Appendix). As of
the date of this writing, an inquiry of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
has not been answered.
60. Substantive Due Process Violation. While the procedural due process
violation just described is based upon ancient authority, a substantive due process
denial can be argued on the basis of this novel legal idea: ALJs have a liberty
interest in exercising the qualified judicial independence guaranteed by the
Administrative Procedure Act-an interest that serves to protect the more
fundamental interests of litigants and the public. Cf Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). There is little doubt that litigants have a property interest in the
entitlements at issue in some administrative proceedings. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, (1976). If this is correct, by randomly interfering with ALJs'
qualified judicial independence and impartiality, as discussed infra, without
advancing a legitimate federal objective, the OPM Regulation falls on every prong
of a Fifth Amendment substantive due process denial of liberty and property. See,
e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L.
REv. 885 (Aug. 2000); Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of
Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397 (1994).
61. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979).
recognized law license.62 While Chief Justice Burger, among others,
would have based the allocation of authority on the Tenth
Amendment ("the States reserved, among other powers, that of
regulating the practice of professions within their borders"),63 the
reserved powers amendment is not presently in vogue as a source of
constitutional law. Some states (Utah, Connecticut) exempt all
federal judges, even all federal lawyers (Alaska), from state licensing
laws,64 but (subject to the obligation of a judge opt out for reasons of
procedural due process, and similar considerations) the principle
expounded by the Supreme Court of Mississippi is undoubtedly
correct: "a state's authority regarding an attorney's license to practice
law is not preempted by the Federal Constitution, notwithstanding
that the licensed attorney may also be a federal judge."65
The problem of federalism arises, of course, when a judge's
obligation under the OPM Regulation is inconsistent with state law.
Consider the following hypothetical-a classic example of "conflict
"66preemption".
A state is concerned about the number of lawyers who
discontinue practice to become hedge fund managers, law professors
or restaurateurs. Accordingly, it adopts a rule to the following effect:
in order to maintain a license to practice law one must, with specified
regularity, either appear before a court or other tribunal as an
advocate for a client, or render legal advice in writing to a client for a
fee. That rule would create an insoluble dilemma for federal
administrative law judges who, as discussed below, are prohibited
from practicing law on pain of removal from office.67 The fact that a
state is unlikely to enact the hypothetical rule does not remove the
offense to federalism, for at least two reasons: (1) the OPM
Regulation occupies an area reserved for state regulation (bar
membership) and is thus proscribed by the "Dormant Commerce
Clause" line of cases,68 and (2) as a practical matter, it has the effect
62. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin (Aug. 13, 2002).
63. In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. See Appendix.
65. State Bar v. Nixon, 494 So. 2d 1388 (Miss. 1986).
66. Id., cf, Collins v. DOJ, 94 M.S.B.P. 62 (2003).
67. See infra.
68. See, e.g., JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAW, 87 (2006), Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d. 316,
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of obliging state bars to adopt rules in conformity with its terms,
"dragooning" them into compliance. 69 As FORUM observed, the
Regulation 7°
intrudes on matters entrusted to the States and
territories. [It] would make OPM a "super" licensor
for all state and territorial jurisdictions. It would
override and/or create conflicting new licensing
requirements and cause ALJs to be in violation of
their ethical obligations under the Judicial Code of
Conduct.7'
345 (4th Cir. 2002); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV and Interstate
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1513 (Apr. 2007).
69. Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Note
that a specific expression of intent to preempt not required for conflict preemption.
Geier v Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
70. Comment dated January 24, 2006. As the Supreme Court noted in 1947,
referring to the preclusive effect of an Act of Congress (which is generally entitled
to greater preclusive effect than a regulation, Hillsborough v. Automated Med.
Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985)) the question is whether the federal interest "is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947). With regard
to state bar regulation, the federal interest is clearly not so dominant.
71. Void for Vagueness. In addition, with respect federal-state relations the
Regulation is hopelessly vague. It would not be vague if it simply required Judges
to comply with state law but, if that were its intent, it would be superfluous as well
as ultra vires. The Regulation purports to supersede state law, at least in part, but
the resulting amalgam of state and federal law is incoherent. The primary mandate
of the Regulation, contained in the first sentence, is couched in terms of uniform
and universal federal preemption, but the exceptions defer to state licensing
authorities with respect to such categories as "active" and "current license to
practice law". The problem, however, is that these are OPM's terms and are not
necessarily used by the states themselves. As a result, states with substantially
identical rules may interpret the OPM Regulation quite differently, and, in fact,
have already done so. Compare the opinion of Christopher L. Slack, First Assistant
Bar Counsel of Connecticut:
In response to your inquiry, please know that Section 2-27(d) of
the Connecticut Practice Book specifically exempts federal
judges (including magistrate judges, administrative law judges
and bankruptcy judges) from the annual registration requirement
imposed upon attorneys admitted in Connecticut. However,
aside from this, I am not aware of any rule or provision which
D. The Regulation is Irrational: Judges Do Not Practice Law
The Regulation requires that ALJs have a "current license to
practice law", but in most states judging is not considered to be the
practice of law, and most judges are prohibited from engaging in the
traditional practice of law. Indeed, with minor exceptions, the
"practice of law by full time judges ['office practice as well as
would otherwise alter the status of such judges, so they would
probably be considered "active" for the purposes of your survey.
with that of Bedford T. Bentley, Jr., Secretary of the State Board of Law Examiners
of Maryland:
A state judge is continued on the roll of attorneys maintained by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Maryland's highest court), but
may not engage in the practice of law, and is exempt from paying
the mandatory assessment required of all practicing attorneys.
(Maryland does not have a unified bar-membership in the
Maryland State Bar Association is voluntary.) In effect, a judge
is "inactive," which is the status of an attorney on the roll of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland who elects not to pay the Client
Protection Fund assessment because he or she is not engaged in
the active practice of law in Maryland.
How should the ambiguity be addressed? While a federal court could, of
course, defer interpretation of the Regulation to the respective states, that approach
would require every state and territorial licensing board to construe the Regulation
in the context of its own law, with inevitable inconsistencies, and would promote
disagreement and litigation in many if not most jurisdictions. (See generally
George V. Burke, Annotation, Supreme Court's Definition and Application of
Doctrine of "Abstention" Where Questions of State Law are Controlling in Federal
Civil Case, 58 L. Ed. 2d 862). A federal court might attempt to make sense of the
regulation without rewriting it, but that attempt would be fraught with problems,
particularly inasmuch as bar status and licensing implicate issues of liberty,
property, speech and association that are beyond the scope of the present article.
(See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Supreme Court's Application of
Vagueness Doctrine to Noncriminal Statutes or Ordinances, 40 L.Ed. 2d 823).
OPM itself does not employ administrative law judges and leaving the task of
construing the Regulation to agencies that do would appear to be an unwarranted
delegation of judicial authority: experience suggests that the construction given by
federal agencies would be no more rational or fair than judicial construction.
Accordingly, with respect to interpretation of the regulatory language only, the
wisest and simplest course would be to declare the Regulation void for vagueness,
and let OPM try again, after informing itself of the diversity of state law
summarized in the Appendix.
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courtroom practice'] 72 has long been prohibited in every American
jurisdiction; ' 73 in some states it is a crime.74 As one commentator
explained:
Canon 4G of the 1990 American Bar Association
Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits full-time
judges from practicing law, and all states have similar
or identical restrictions. The comparable prohibition
in the 1972 model code was enacted because the
'likelihood of conflicts of interest, the appearance of
impropriety, and the appearance of lack of
impartiality-all have their greatest potential in the
practice of law by a full-time judge.' 75
Although federal ALJs are presently classified under Article I of
the U.S. Constitution, there is little doubt that the prohibition against
practicing law applies to them. As in the case of Butz v. Economou,76
the relevant consideration here is judicialfunction. 77 After a long and
not unopposed history, 78 federal administrative law judges are now
authoritatively recognized as functionally equivalent to trial courts. 7 9
72. MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATERSON, THE JUDICIARY: SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE (1987).
73. SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 238 (3rd ed. 2000).
74. E.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-11 (2007).
75. JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER (Spring 1999) (citing E. WAYNE THODE,
REPORTER'S NOTES TO [1972] CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 91 (ABA 1973)).
76. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); see also R.I. Dep't of Envtl.
Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002).
77. "The 'judiciary' for whom judicial independence is a defining normative
expectation are the officials and institutions that perform the central judicial
function of adjudication. . . . [Adjudication] is the provision of authoritative
settlements of disputes about legal rights and duties." Peter H. Russell, Toward a
General Theory of Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE
OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 8-9 (Univ.
Press of Virginia, 2001).
78. See, e.g., Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128
(1953), SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASEBOOK 423 (1977), MULLINS, op
cit, KOCH, op cit.
79. As one authority expressed it, federal administrative law judges now
"have much the same status and perform the same functions as trial judges.... In
accordance with their status, they are paid at the top of the government pay scale
Indeed, as the Supreme Court flatly stated in 2002, the similarity
between administrative law judge proceedings and civil litigation in
Federal District Court is "overwhelming". 80
Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act, which is directly
applicable, prohibits ALJs from performing "duties inconsistent with
their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges"
Accordingly, the APA can also be read to proscribe activities that
give rise to the appearance of impropriety and lack of impartiality.8
In those rare instances where ethics problems have arisen, OPM
itself has applied the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct to federal
administrative law judges.82 Thus, in 1993, the practice of law by an
administrative law judge resulted in his dismissal.83 And in at least
one jurisdiction, "[i]f a judge were to maintain his or her active
status, he or she could be accused of holding out as authorized to
practice law, thus violating Virginia's Unauthorized practice of Law
Rules.84 Accordingly, as noted by a commentator quoted above,
while it would be rational to insist that judges be competent in the
law, the OPM Regulation is not rationally related to that ideal;
indeed, it is irrational to require that all administrative law judges in
every jurisdiction submit to licensing requirements that may impose
and their pay is protected." CHARLES KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
435-36; (1997); see also MULLINS, 1-2.
80. FMC v. S. C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759 (2002).
81. See 5 U.S.C § 3105. A similar point was made by the Federal Bar
Association in response to the NPMR.
82. E.g., In the Matter of Chocallo, 1 M.S.P.R. 605 (1978), aft'd, I M.S.P.R.
612 (1980). The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Federal Administrative
Law Judges (February 1989) Canon 5(f) states flatly: "An administrative law judge
should not practice law."
83. SSA v. Whittlesey, 59 M.S.P.B. 684 (1993). The decision relies both on
the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Conduct (which, since
February 2007 expressly applies to ALJs [I.(B)]) and on the SSA Guide on
Employee Conduct, which, in Part VII, Section 1, imposing restrictions on
administrative law judges noted: "an appearance of impropriety and, in many cases,
of conflict of interest is created when an individual acts as an advocate in disputes
between parties who may later appear before the individual acting as an ALJ." See
also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES CANON 2 (ABA 1989).
84. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES CANON 2 (ABA 1989).
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demands inconsistent with the responsibilities of their office. To
emphasize, administrative law judges do not practice law.
E. The Regulation is Arbitrary
The NPRM comments of another judge, raising issues not yet
discussed, is worth quoting at length, not least because of its
reasonable tone:
I was hired in 1994 and converted my attorney license
to "Restricted" status (Minnesota) based on the
information I then had that we did not have to
maintain a "practicing" license. I know many other
Judges took similar actions depending on their state of
licensure. Restricted means I can represent immediate
family but am forbidden from any form of "public"
practice. I still pay the "practicing" judge or attorney
annual license fee. In order to convert back to
"active" status, I can be required to take up to 90
hours of CLE after reapplication to the CLE Board.
This, of course, could be extremely onerous and
expensive. Most of this would have to be done on
annual leave. Because Minnesota has a very stringent
"in-house" course prohibition (Rule 5 of the MN CLE
Board Rules) it is questionable whether the courses
offered at the ALJ conference would be approved for
credit.
The reason I am pointing out the Minnesota criteria is
that if we are all required to reactivate, what everyone
will have to do will vary greatly depending on the
state they are, or were, licensed in. Many Judges no
longer have ANY connection to the state they are
(were) licensed in and it would not make much sense
to comply with that state's requirements. What will
result if reactivation is required is very disparate
treatment depending on one's current "non-active"
status and the state of licensure. Some Judges would
have a very minimal upgrading requirement which
would involve only paying a licensure fee. Some have
"judicial" status and because they are no longer in the
state of licensure, they have no on going CLE
requirement .... 85
These practical considerations, however, should not obscure the
fact that the Regulation, as previously discussed at length, adversely
affects a matter of vital public importance: the impartial
administration of justice.
Meeker v. OPM86  notwithstanding, in this age of multi-state
practice it is at least possible to imagine a rational basis for the
requirement that government attorneys, particularly litigators,
maintain active bar membership. A requirement that ALJs know the
law of the state in which they sit would also be rational: Social
Security ALJs, for example, frequently interpret state laws pertaining
to domestic relations, intestate succession and property.87  A
requirement that ALJs be licensed in that state, however, would be
disruptive, to say the least. Perhaps (because Social Security ALJs'
control the distribution of benefits in a non-adversarial proceeding)
SSA has sought to shelter them from undue pressure by assigning
them to jurisdictions far removed from their former colleagues and
partners. For whatever reason, ALJs are often, if not usually,
admitted to practice in one state and serve in another.
What rational basis underlies OPM's requirement that an AU,
sitting in one state, be an "active" member of the bar of another state,
perhaps thousands of miles away? How is "active non-resident
status", where it exists, superior to the "inactive" status recognized
by other states? 88 What is wrong with simple good standing in such
bar status as the licensing state deems appropriate? 89 The final
regulation does not say.
85. Letter from Judge (on file with author).
86. Meeker v. OPM, DC-300A-98-0467-2 (1998).
87. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.330, 20; C.F.R. § 404.350, 20; C.F.R. §
416.1201.
88. "No constitutional or legislative purpose directed to establishing a
threshold test of competency is to be served by requiring 'active' as contrasted with
'inactive' membership in the bar." In re Dalthorp, 598 P.2d 788 (Wash. App.
1979).
89. "Although Art. 6, Section 28 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits the
practice of law by a 'judge of any court of record,' this does not mean that a judge
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The difference in impact upon the thousand plus ALJs affected by
the regulation is significant: ALJs licensed in some states (e.g.,
California, New York), if electing "active" status, must pay hundreds
of dollars of bar dues annually, while ALJs licensed in other states
(e.g. Vermont, Virginia) are totally exempt from bar dues-even
though they may all live and work in Alaska. Other potential
burdens (for example, contributions to client protection funds), while
not itemized in this article, vary from state to state.
Nowhere-in its many pronouncements leading up to the final
rule or in the final rule itself-does OPM identify any problem the
active bar membership rule was intended to remedy. In fact, there
was no problem other than OPM's own involvement in the issue.
Even if there had been a problem (as the AALJ points out in its
comment), OPM was obliged to "examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its actions, including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made"; 90
and a court "may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action
that the agency itself has not given." 91 Thus, in addition to the other
fatal defects discussed in this article, the absence of a researched and
demonstrated rational basis for the bar membership requirement
renders the final rule arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of agency
discretion.
IV CONCLUSION
By conflating the role of attorney and judge the final regulation
does much to undermine the principle of judicial independence set
forth in the APA. The Regulation is invalid for multiple reasons,
eight of which (ultra vires, procedural due process, federalism,
substantive due process, arbitrariness, irrationality, vagueness and the
need not remain in good standing with the Bar when he becomes a judge." In re
Riley, 691 P.2d 695 (Ariz. 1984).
90. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.
156 (1962)).
91. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); see also Prinz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV and
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1513 (April 2007) (discussing
"dormant commerce clause" issues).
bona fides of OPM's participation in the administrative rule making
process) are discussed in the preceding pages.
Long before they were granted the title of administrative law
judges, hearing examiners strove for the greater professionalism,
higher ethical standards, and enhanced public service that can only be
attained through judicial independence. 92 For decades, organizations
such as National Association of Administrative Law Judges, the
ABA National Conference of Administrative Judges, and the
Association of Administrative Law Judges have sponsored codes of
judicial ethics for administrative law judges,93 published educational
journals and conducted periodic seminars of continuing judicial
education-seminars for which the judges themselves, rather than
their employing agencies, have born the bulk of the cost. What is
needed, if the administrative judiciary is to continue on the path of
improvement, is not the confusion of roles inherent in the new
regulation. At the very least, it is freedom from abuses such as those
described in this article.
Courageous judges-and there are a few-who insist upon
maintaining an appropriate bar status despite the OPM Regulation are
at risk of selective removal proceedings: those suspected of some
non-existent or un-provable wrongdoing, or who are out of favor
with the agency for some other reason, are most likely to be
targeted.94 For these reasons, among the many others discussed
herein, the AALJ was correct in undertaking preemptive litigation.
92. See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
93. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and
Government Lawyers, 1I WIDENER J. PUB. L. (2002) (that a judge need not remain
in good standing with the Bar when he becomes a judge). See also In re Riley, 691
P.2d 695 (Ariz. 1984).
93. See supra note 9 1.
93. See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
93. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Modern Ethical Dilemmas for ALJs and
Government Lawyers, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. (2002).
94. In addition, disappointed litigants may be expected to attack the
legitimacy of decisions by ALJs who fail to maintain the prescribed bar status. As
noted in the discussion of procedural due process, supra, this was tried without
success in a Social Security proceeding: the District Court refused to hold that an
ALJs inactive California status invalidated his decision. Meza v. Massanai, 199
F.R.D. 573 (S.D. Texas). Although the Court did not address the point, I contend,
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The AALJ endorses the concept that all ALJs be in "good
standing" with their respective bars. While this concept is
praiseworthy, in some states "good standing" is a term of art. In the
opinion of the present writer, OPM should not attempt to regulate the
bar status of sitting judges at all. Rather, a court should declare that
it is the responsibility of state licensing authorities to create the
safeguards and firewalls necessary to preserve judicial independence,
and, in so doing, to make a determination, subject to judicial review,
of "what constitutes an appropriate bar status for sitting federal
administrative law judges". 95
for reasons discussed above at length, that the AL's inactive status was not only
appropriate, but may have been constitutionally mandated.
95. Comment dated December 19, 2005.
APPENDIX:
Compendium of State and Territorial Rules Pertaining to the Bar
Status of Federal Administrative Law Judges
A. Mandatory State Bars
ALABAMA - MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR
"All lawyers who are qualified to practice law in Alabama and
who are not engaged in active practice because they are holding a
state or federal office that precludes them from practicing law may
become members of the Alabama Bar Association by paying directly
to the secretary of such association an annual sum equal to 50 percent
of the money collected by the State of Alabama from a lawyer as a
privilege license tax to engage in the practice of law. Upon payment
of said sum as prescribed in the preceding sentence, such persons
shall be entitled to all the privileges and benefits common to other
members of such association." ALA. CODE § 34-3-17.
"Inactive"
"An attorney who chooses not to purchase an occupational
license or pay special membership dues will be removed from the
Alabama State Bar roll of attorneys in good standing. Those in
this status are not considered members in good standing. At the
present time, an attorney may reactivate his/her membership at
any time by paying either of the above membership fees."
Alabama State Bar, Membership Status Information, available at
http://www.alabar.org/members/information.cfm.
ALASKA - ALL FEDERAL LAWYERS EXEMPT*
State judges are required to be active members of the bar;
"Inactive membership in the Alaska Bar is limited to members who
no longer engage in the practice of law or hold judicial office or any
other legal position in the State of Alaska." ALASKA BAR
Ass. BY LAWS art. II, § 1 (a). However, federal judges in Alaska are
not required to be Alaska bar members. "The federal government
can set its own requirements for persons serving as federal judges,
magistrates, US attorneys, military lawyers, administrative law
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judges, etc. They are not bound by state licensing requirements."
Email from Deborah O'Regan, Executive Director, Alaska Bar
Association (July 3, 2007).
ARIZONA - JUDICIAL STATUS
"Classes of Members. Members of the state bar shall be divided
into five classes: active, inactive, retired, suspended, and judicial. A
disbarred person is not a member." ARIz. SuP. CT. R. 32(c) 1. "An
active member who has retired from or is not engaged in practice in
Arizona may be transferred to inactive status upon written request to
the executive director. Inactive members shall not practice law in
Arizona.. ." ARiz. SuP. CT. R. 32(c) 4. "Judicial members shall be
justices of the Supreme Court of Arizona, judges of the Court of
Appeals and Superior Court of Arizona and of the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona. Judicial membership status
shall likewise be accorded to members of the state bar who are full-
time commissioners, city or municipal court judges, judges pro
tempore or justices of the peace in the state of Arizona not engaged
in the practice of law, or justices or judges of other courts of record
of the United States or of the several states..." ARiz. SuP. CT. R.
32(c) 5.
"Practice of law" in Arizona is defined to include "Preparing or
expressing legal opinions" but the definition does not expressly
include adjudication. ARIz. SuP. CT. R. 31 A. "Except as hereinafter
provided in section (d), no person shall practice law in this state or
represent in any way that he or she may practice law in this state
unless the person is an active member of the state bar." ARIz. SuP.
CT. R. 31 D(b). "Nothing in these rules shall prohibit an officer or
employee of a governmental entity from performing the duties of his
or her office or carrying out the regular course of business of the
governmental entity." Auz. SuP. CT. R. 31 D(d) 23. Arizona has an
elaborate system of state administrative adjudication in which both
lawyers and non-lawyers are, in specified instances, authorized to
participate.
Judge Michael Cianci, a Judicial member of the Arizona bar
confirms the accuracy of this information, but reports that the issue is
unsettled, apparently by reason of the OPM Regulation. Email from
Judge Michael Cianci (September 8, 2007).
CALIFORNIA - INACTIVE STATUS
"Every person admitted and licensed to practice law in [CA] is
and shall be a member of the State Bar except while holding office as
a judge of a court of record." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (2007). The
available statuses for members of the state bar are "active" (defined
as members "who are eligible to practice law in California"),
"inactive" (who may transfer to "active" status at any time upon
request), "not eligible", "resigned" and "disbarred." An ALJ may
enroll as an inactive member if he or she is not otherwise engaged in
the practice of law. CAL. STATE BAR RULES & REGS § 2. Bar dues
are reduced for inactive members. ALJs are exempt from CLE
requirements. "MCLE Rules and Regulations 6.1.5 State and Federal
judges who are appointed pursuant to judicial article authority are
exempt from membership in the State Bar during their continuance in
office. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6002; CAL. CONST. art. VI, §
9. We list their status as "JUDGE" in our membership database."
Email from Dina DiLoreto, Director of Administration, Member
Services, The State Bar of California (May 4, 2007).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA - JUDICIAL STATUS.
Three classes of membership: active, inactive and judicial.
Inactive and judicial members are not eligible to practice law in D.C.
The annual dues is reduced for inactive members and further reduced
for judicial members. After a series of policy changes instigated by
OPM in 2000, the rules were amended (effective July 1, 2001) to
state that ALJs "shall be classified as judicial members, except that if
a member's terms and conditions of employment require that he or
she be eligible to practice law, then the member may choose to be an
active member." D.C. BAR R. 2 § 4.
FLORIDA - ACTIVE STATUS
Judges maintain active status. Fl. Rules and Regulations of the
Bar, R. 1-3.1. Email from Johnny M. Smith, Assistant Director-
Finance, Florida State Bar, May 8, 2007.
GEORGIA -- [unclear: no response to inquiry]
"All lawyers who are neither engaged in the practice of law nor
holding themselves out as practicing attorneys nor occupying any
public or private position in which they may be called upon to give
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legal advice or counsel or to examine the law or to pass upon the
legal effect of any act, document, or law may be inactive members at
their election." GA. BAR RULES & REGS. R. 1-202(a). "Active
members shall be all other lawyers including judges . . . GA. BAR
RULES & REGS. R. 1-202(b). State judges clearly must belong to the
mandatory bar, but the rules do not specifically address the status of
federal judges.
HAWAII - ACTIVE STATUS
The Hawaii Constitution is silent with regard to whether the bar
license must be classified as "active" at the time of appointment or
while a judge is serving on the bench. As a matter of tradition and
practice judges maintain "active" licenses during their tenure on the
bench. Marsha Kitagawa, Public Affairs Officer, Hawaii State
Judiciary.
IDAHO - AFFILIATE STATUS*
All persons who have been heretofore, or shall hereafter be,
duly admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court of this state,
and who have not been disbarred or suspended therefrom, and who
shall have paid the license fee in this Act provided for, and all judges
of the district and Supreme Courts of this state, and of the district
court of the United States for Idaho, are hereby declared to be
members of the Idaho State Bar. IDAHO CODE § 3-405 (2007).
However, judges are not subject to the licensing requirements; they
do not pay license fees or submit license forms to the Idaho State
Bar. Judicial discipline is not handled by the bar but by the Idaho
Judicial Council. The other statuses are: active, affiliate, inactive,
house counsel, emeritus. "We don't consider federal administrative
law judges in the judge category. I think they have licensed as
affiliates but my understanding is that now the rules have changed
and they need to have an active license." Email from Diane Minnich
(June 26, 2007).
KENTUCKY - ACTIVE STATUS
All state and federal judges and justices are active, dues paying
members. SuP. CT. R. 3.030, 3.040. However, "both Article III
judges and state court judges have a reduced dues requirement."
Email from James L. Deckard, Executive Director, Kentucky Bar
Association (May 9, 2007).
LOUISIANA - ACTIVE STATUS
All persons, including judges, who are licensed to practice law in
Louisiana are active members of the Louisiana State Bar Association.
LA. STATE BAR ASS'N ARTICLES OF INC. art. IV, § 1. Email from
Loretta Larsen, CAE, Executive Director, Louisiana State Bar
Association (May 14, 2007).
MICHIGAN - ACTIVE STATUS
"A person engaged in the practice of law in Michigan must be an
active member of the State Bar. In addition to its traditional
meaning, the term "person engaged in the practice of law" in this rule
includes a person licensed to practice law in Michigan or another
jurisdiction and employed in Michigan in the administration of
justice or in a position which requires that the person be a law school
graduate, but does not include (1) a judicial law clerk who is a
member or is seeking to become a member of the bar of another
jurisdiction and who does not intend to practice in Michigan after the
clerkship ends, or (2) an instructor in law." MICH. STATE BAR R.
3(a).
MISSISSIPPI - ACTIVE STATUS
In Mississippi, attorneys elected or appointed to the bench are
considered in good standing and active members of the Bar. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9-1-25. Email from Betty Sephton, Clerk Sup. Ct. of
Appeals (May 8, 2007).
MISSOURI-DEEMED ACTIVE
Designations such as "active", "inactive" etc., are not used by the
Missouri bar. Persons in good standing with the bar must pay annual
dues, including ALJs and judges, unless they are retired, have been
licensed for 50 years, or are 75 years or more old. SuP. CT. R. 6.01,
confirmed by email from Bill L. Thompson, Counsel, Supreme Court
of Missouri (June 20, 2007).
MONTANA - JUDICIAL STATUS
ALJs are judicial members of the mandatory bar. MONT STATE
BAR BYLAWS art. 1, § 3(a). Email from Betsy Brandborg, Bar
Counsel (May 8, 2007).
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NEBRASKA -- ACTIVE STATUS
Judges are active members of the Bar. RULES CREATING,
CONTROLLING AND REGULATING THE NEB. STATE BAR ASS'N R. 32.1.
Email from Jane Schoenike, Director, Nebraska State Bar
Association (July 2, 2007).
NEVADA - ACTIVE STATUS
"Members of the state bar shall be divided into four classes: (a)
Active members admitted to practice in any jurisdiction 5 years or
more. (b) Active members who are also members of the federal
judiciary, regardless of years of admission to practice in any
jurisdiction. (c) Active members admitted to practice in any
jurisdiction less than 5 years, (d) Inactive members." NEV. SuP. CT.
R. 98 1. "No member of the state bar actively engaged in the practice
of law in this state, or holding any judicial office in this state, or
occupying a position in the employ of or rendering any legal service
for an active member, or occupying a position where he is called
upon to give legal advice or counsel or examine the law or pass upon
the legal effect of any act, document or law in this state, shall be
enrolled as an inactive member." NEV. SuP. CT. R. 98 4 (copy
provided by Rob W. Bare, Bar Counsel).
NEW HAMPSHIRE - "INACTIVE" : NO STATE BASED
REQUIREMENT
"The membership of this Association shall consist of two
classes known respectively as "active" members and "inactive"
members. Every member shall be an active member unless, upon
request and payment of any required Administrative Fee as set by the
Board of Governors, that person is enrolled as an inactive member.
No person shall be eligible for enrollment as an inactive member who
is engaged in the practice of law in this State, or who occupies a
position the duties of which require the giving of legal advice or
service in this State. Any inactive member in good standing may
change classification to that of an active member [etc.]" N.H. BAR
CONST. art. II, § 3. "[There] appears to be no state-law imposed law
license status for federal administrative law judges." Email from
Landya B. McCafferty, Disciplinary Counsel, Attorney Discipline
Office, Concord, New Hampshire (July 24, 2007).
NEW MEXICO - [no response to inquiry; presumably "active"
status]
"All circuit court of appeals judges, district court judges,
bankruptcy judges and full-time magistrates of the United States who
reside in New Mexico and all full-time judges of tribal courts who
have an L.L.B. or J.D. degree and who reside in New Mexico or
exercise jurisdiction in New Mexico shall be honorary members of
the state bar with the same rights and privileges as active status
members. Honorary members shall not pay any license fees.
Honorary members may not engage in the private or public practice
of law." N.M. BARR. 24-105.
NORTH CAROLINA - ACTIVE STATUS*
The active members shall be all persons who have obtained
licenses entitling them to practice law in North Carolina, including
persons serving as justices or judges of any state or federal court in
this state, unless classified as inactive members by the council. All
active members must pay the annual membership fee. N.C. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 1, sub. ch. A, § 0201(b). "Approximately, fourteen years
ago, the federal district court judges determined that they do not have
to hold active law licenses from North Carolina. Since that time,
most of the federal district court judges have petitioned for and been
granted inactive status. To serve in the North Carolina state courts,
however, the judge must have an active North Carolina law license."
Letter from Tammy Jackson, Membership Director (June 21, 2007).
(For the response of Hon. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief Judges, U.S.
Dist. Court, E.D.N.C., see note 59.)
NORTH DAKOTA -- MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR
"The membership of the state bar association of North Dakota
consists of every person: 1. Who has secured an annual license to
practice law in this state from the state board of law examiners in
accordance with section 27-11-22; or 2. Who has an unrevoked
certificate of admission to the bar of this state and who has paid an
annual membership fee to the state bar association." N.D. CENT.
CODE §27-12-02. "The Rules of the State Bar Association of North
Dakota, adopted pursuant to its bylaws, shall be filed with the Clerk
of the Supreme Court." N.D.R. PROC. R. § 9A.
"In North Dakota, we do not have a special status for Article III
judges.... We are a mandatory bar state, so upon licensure someone
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is a member of the North Dakota State Bar Association. Admitted,
but unlicensed members may become Associate members of the
Association for a nominal fee, but do not have voting privileges in
the Association." Email from Penny Miller, Clerk, North Dakota
Supreme Court (May 8, 2007).
The Bylaws of the ND State Bar do not specify membership
categories.
OKLAHOMA - ACTIVE STATUS
"Members of the Association shall be divided into three classes,
namely, (a) active members, (b) senior members, and (c) associate
members. No other categories of membership may be allowed."
RULES CREATING THE OK. BAR ASS'N art 2, § 2. "[It appears, based
on my research, that] there is no distinction made between judges and
attorneys, or between judges of record and federal administrative law
judges. Many Judges have Active status, and a few have Senior
status. I have found none with Associate status. Associate status is
usually only for those disabled for a prolonged period." Email from
Tom Ellis, Intern, Office of General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar
Association (July 16, 2007).
OREGON - INACTIVE STATUS
A member of the Bar who does not practice law may be enrolled
as an inactive member. The "practice of law" for purposes of this
subsection consists of providing legal services to public, corporate or
individual clients or the performing of the duties of a position that
federal, state, county or municipal law requires to be occupied by a
person admitted to the practice of law in Oregon. ORE. STATE BAR
BYLAWS 6.100(b).
RHODE ISLAND - JUDICIAL STATUS
"Article X of The Rhode Island Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canons of Judicial Ethics, titled 'Application of the Code of Judicial
Conduct', provides: "Anyone ...who is an officer of a judicial
system and who performs judicial functions, including an officer
such as a magistrate ... is a judge within the meaning of this Code.
Full time judges and retired judges who are eligible on temporary
judicial assignment and are not engaged in the practice of law shall
be classed as "judicial" members. R.I. BAR ASS'N BY LAWS art. III,
§ 3.3.
"Several judges in this office were active lawyers in Rhode Island
prior to their appointment as federal ALJ's. They have discussed the
Rhode Island Supreme Court and Bar Association Rules (and ALJ's
appropriate status under those rules) with officials of the Court and
Association, respectively. They are informed by those officials that
the appropriate status for federal ALJ's is "judicial," and those ALJ's
are so licensed/registered, with both the Court and the Association."
Members of the State and Federal judiciary are exempt from the
payment of the [annual] registration fee while holding said office."
R.I Sup. CT. R. art. IV, R. 2. "Judges are also excused from Bar
Association membership dues or other fees."
"Article IX, Section G of the Code, entitled "Practice of Law",
provides: 'A judge shall not practice law ... ' Email from Judge
Hugh Atkins (Aug. 6, 2007).
SOUTH CAROLINA-JUDICIAL STATUS
The following persons who are licensed to practice law in this
State ... shall be classified as judicial members: ...all judges of
Federal Courts, including Federal Magistrates and Administrative
Judges. S.C. BAR BY-LAWS art. 1, § 1.1; Email from Emory Smith,
SC Attorney General's Office (May 11, 2007).
SOUTH DAKOTA -- [unclear; no response to inquiry]
"The membership of the state bar shall be all persons who are
now or may hereafter be entitled to practice law in this state." S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 16-17-3. The state bar has the power to adopt
bylaws and rules. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-17-7. This author has
been unable to locate any relevant bylaw or rule.)
TEXAS -- [inquiry unanswered; apparently inactive status]
Membership in the State Bar of Texas "is one of four classes:
active, inactive, emeritus, or associate" TEX. GOv'T CODE §
81.052(a). An inactive member is a person who is eligible for active
membership but not engaged in the practice of law in Texas. TEX.
Gov'T CODE § 81.052(c)(1). "A judge shall not practice law except
as permitted by statute or this Code." TEX. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4.
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UTAH - INACTIVE STATUS
"All state judges of courts of record in Utah must be licensed
here. At present, they also must be on "active" status. That may
change, however, sometime in the future, based on our relatively new
Utah Supreme Court definition of the practice of law found at Rule
14-801(Authorization to Practice Law) in the Utah Supreme Courts
Rules of Professional Practice. . . . Most state administrative law
judges must also be licensed and on "active" status for the same
reasons... The requirement to be on "active" status does not apply
to federal administrative law judges just as they do not apply to
federal district or appellate court judges within our state [on the
theory of federal preemption]." Email from Katherine A. Fox,
General Counsel, Utah State Bar (July 10, 2007).
VIRGINIA - JUDICIAL STATUS
Four classes of membership: "active", "associate" (i.e., attorneys
residing and practicing outside of Virginia), "judicial" and
"disabled/retired". "All full time judges . . . and other officers
qualified but forbidden by statute to practice law ... shall constitute
the Judiciai membership of the Virginia State Bar." VA. SuP. CT. R.
Part 6, § IV, 3. "If a judge were to maintain his or her active status,
he or she could be accused of holding out as authorized to practice
law in Virginia, thus violating Virginia's Unauthorized Practice of
Law Rules." Letter from James M. McCauley, Ethics Counsel,
Virginia State Bar (May 21, 1999).
WASHINGTON - INACTIVE STATUS
While, a "full time administrative law judge is eligible for
judicial status", BY LAWS OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSN. art.
II A 3, and while "judicial members are not required to pay the
annual fee required of inactive members," WASH. STATE BAR ASSN.
BY LAWS art. II A 4, this language "has always been interpreted to
mean state ALJs [and does not apply to] Federal ALJs .... [This] is
the consistent interpretation that has been applied for many years."
Email from Jean McElroy, Director of Regulatory Service, WSBA
(July 24, 2007).
WEST VIRGINIA - INACTIVE STATUS
The State Bar By-Laws art. II, § 4 specifies that "every judge of a
court of record", a member of the faculty of law of the College of
Law, West Virginia University, and certain others "shall be enrolled
as an inactive member" but is silent regarding ALJs. Cheryl L.
Wright, Administrative Assistant, The WV State Bar, states that "All
judges are inactive status, since they do not practice law outside of
their scope of being a judge." Email from (June 19, 2007).
WISCONSIN - JUDICIAL STATUS*
c . Judges of courts of record, full-time family court
commissioners, full-time court commissioners, U.S. bankruptcy
judges, U.S. magistrate judges and retired judges who are eligible for
temporary judicial assignment and are not engaged in the practice of
law are classed as judicial members. . ." SuP. CT. R. 103(3)(a). *
"At this time [June 2007], the matter of ALJ's being judicial
members is under review Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Bar has
asked for clarification of S.C.R. 10.03(3)(a) which covers judicial
membership. The Court has asked the Bar to conduct a study of the
and report the findings so they will be able to issue an opinion".
Email from Julie A. Chrisler, Member Records Manager, State Bar of
Wisconsin (June 20, 2007).
WYOMING -- ACTIVE OR INACTIVE STATUS?
The members of the State Bar shall be divided into four (4)
classes known respectively as active, inactive, honorary and retired.
An inactive member is one not practicing law in Wyoming and
electing to pay the reduced license fee. An honorary member is a
Wyoming Supreme Court justice, district court judge, circuit court
judge, magistrate, judge of the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming and any other federal judge resident of this
state, and a justice or judge retired from such courts who has not
resumed the practice of law. A retired member is one not engaged in
the practice of law. All other members are active members. WYO.
STATE BAR BYLAWS art. I, § 3(A)(c). Only active members may
practice law. No individual other than an enrolled active member of
the State Bar shall practice in this state or in any manner hold
themselves out as authorized or qualified to practice law... WYo.
STATE BAR BYLAWS art. I, § 3.
B. Voluntary State Bars
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ARKANSAS - ACTIVE STATUS
"Judges of courts of Record in the State of Arkansas are required
to be active members of the Bar of Arkansas and keep their licenses
current." Letter of Stark Ligon, Executive Director, Supreme Court
of Arkansas Office of Professional Conduct (June 27, 2007).
COLORADO - ACTIVE STATUS
"[Each] year, every attorney admitted to practice in Colorado
(including judges, those admitted on a provisional or temporary basis
and those admitted as judge advocate) shall annually file a
registration statement and pay a fee ... The annual fee for an
attorney on inactive status [is reduced]" COLO. R. Civ. P. 227.
"[O]ur registration card has in bold letters the would "active." Email
from Judge Jon L. Lawritson (July 26, 2007). "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to require membership in a professional
organization or bar association as a prerequisite to licensure." COLO.
REV. STAT. 12-5-101. With certain exceptions, judges are prohibited
from practicing law. COLO. REV. STAT. 13-2-107; 12-5-110.
CONNECTICUT - NO FORMAL DESIGNATION:
PROBABLY DEEMED "ACTIVE"
Section 2-27(d) of the Connecticut Practice Book specifically
exempts federal judges (including magistrate judges, administrative
law judges and bankruptcy judges) from the annual registration
requirement imposed upon attorneys admitted in Connecticut.
However, aside from this, I am not aware of any rule or provision
which would otherwise alter the status of such judges, so they would
probably be considered "active" for the purposes of your survey.
Christopher L. Slack, First Assistant Bar Counsel, Statewide
Grievance Committee.
DELAWARE-JUDICIAL STATUS
Supreme Court Rule 69(e)
(http://courts.delaware.gov/Rules/#supreme) provides that
"Judicial members" of the Delaware Bar are "those judges,
commissioners and masters who are disqualified from the practice of
law and those retired judges who do not practice law." In addition,
"judicial members are exempt from the process of annual registration
with the Court." Email from Michael S. McGinniss, Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Delaware (July 9, 2007).
ILLINOIS - INACTIVE STATUS
Although the Illinois State Bar Association recognizes various
status categories, it is a voluntary association and no lawyer is
required to join. However, every attorney admitted to practice law in
Illinois is required to register and pay an annual registration fee. ILL.
SuP. CT. R. 756(a).
No registration fee is required of any attorney during the period
he or she may be serving in the office of justice, judge, associate
judge or magistrate of a court of the United States of America or the
State of Illinois or the office of judicial law clerk, administrative
assistant, secretary or assistant secretary to such a justice, judge,
associate judge or magistrate, or during any period in which he or she
is receiving a retirement annuity pursuant to Title 28, Chapter 17 of
the United States Code or Chapter 40, Act 5, Article 18 of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes.
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 756(a)(4) (administrative law judges are not
eligible for this exemption).
"Active" status is not specifically defined in the Supreme Court
rules, but the rules permit an attorney to assume inactive status and,
thereafter, register as an inactive status attorney. The annual
registration fee for an inactive status attorney [is reduced]. Upon
such registration, the attorney shall be placed upon inactive status
and shall no longer be eligible to practice law or hold himself or
herself out as being authorized to practice law in.
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 756 (a) (5). Since ALJs neither practice law nor
hold themselves out as authorized to practice law as those terms are
understood in Illinois (ILL. CONST., ART. VI, § 13 provides that state
Supreme Court Judges "shall not practice law"), ALJs appear to be
eligible for inactive status (reduced registration fee), but have been
denied full waiver of the registration fee on the grounds that the ALJ
position does not fall within one of the categories listed in Rule
756(a)(4). However, every attorney admitted to practice law in
Illinois is required to register and pay an annual registration fee to the
Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. ILL.
SuP. CT. R. 756(a). Presently, ALJs are not exempt from the
registration fee. AALJ Comment on Proposed Rule 5 C.F.R.
930.204(b) and email from Judge Michael Logan.
INDIANA - NO STATE BASED REQUIRED STATUS
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"Indiana state judges must be in active good-standing (IND. R.
ADMIS. B. & DIsc. ATT'Y 1). There is no rule that positively states
this, but it is a logical inference from the fact that in order to take
inactive or retired status, one must file an affidavit stating, inter alia,
that one 'neither holds judicial office nor is engaged in the practice of
law in this state.' The terms active and inactive good-standing are
not explicitly defined, but there are definitions that are easily inferred
from the rules. IND. R. ADMIS. B. & DIsc. ATT'Y 2(b) (requires
members of the bar to register annually and pay an annual fee. Ind.
IND. R. ADMIS. B. & DIsc. ATT'Y (a)). Thus, the answer to your
question is that Indiana state judges must pay the annual active
registration fee. Email from Donald R. Lundberg, Executive
Secretary, Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission (July 13,
2007).
However, "federal court judges and federal administrative law
judges do not have any state-based required status for their Indiana
law licenses." Email from Donald R. Lundberg (July 11, 2007).
The reason I come to the position I have on federal judges and
administrative law judges is that they are not judges or law
practitioners 'in this state.' This is simply an application of
federalism. They may be physically located in Indiana, but their
professional activities are 'in' the federal arena. . . . I believe the
Supremacy Clause would preclude a state from requiring that federal
judges and ALJ's be state bar members.
Email from Donald R. Lundberg (July 13, 2007).
IOWA - ACTIVE STATUS
All judges must be active and in good standing. IOWA CT. R.
39.5, 39.6, 41.3. An ALJ in the federal government would be
classified as "government" and would be expected to file annual
reports, pay the annual fee for support of the disciplinary system, and
also pay any required assessments for the Client Security Trust Fund.
Email from Paul H. Wieck II, Executive Director & Assistant
Court Administrator, Iowa Supreme Court (May 14, June 19, 2007).
KANSAS - INACTIVE STATUS
"All attorneys, including justices and judges, admitted to the
practice of law before the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas"
must register annually... Attorneys may register as: active; inactive;
retired; or disabled due to mental or physical disabilities. Only
attorneys registered as active may practice law in Kansas. KAN. SuP.
CT. R. 208 (a).
"Each active Supreme Court Justice, Court of Appeals Judge, and
District Court Judge within the State of Kansas shall earn a minimum
of 40 hours of approved continuing judicial education in each 3-year
period," KAN. SUP. CT. R. 501, but "unless exempt under subsection
(d) of this rule, each attorney admitted to practice law in Kansas shall
earn a minimum of twelve (12) continuing legal education (CLE)
credit hours in each annual registration period." KAN. SUP. CT. R.
802. Subdivision (d)(3) exempts from the CLE requirement
"[f]ederal and state justices and judges who are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law." KAN. SuP. CT. R. 802(d)(3).
See also "[s]ection 208(f)(2), regarding reinstatement of an
attorney who has been in inactive status for more than 5 years and
which provides for payment of an additional fee along with, 'full
compliance with any conditions imposed by the supreme Court for
reinstatement." These, by all appearances, could include conditions
beyond showing that one has attended courses affording CLE hours
required by rule 802(a)."' Email from Judge Melvin B. Werner,
HOCALJ, Wichita ODAR (July 31, 2007).
MAINE - Registered? Inquiry unanswered
The Board of Overseers of the Bar shall, consistent with Rule 6,
establish procedures for and supervise the registration of all attorneys
admitted to the practice of law in this State. ME. BAR R. 4. A justice
or judge shall be subject to the provisions of these rules as to conduct
relevant to that person's position as an attorney and as to conduct
prior to becoming, or after ceasing to be, a Justice or Judge. ME.
BARR. 1.
MARYLAND - DEEMED "INACTIVE" STATUS
In effect, a judge is "inactive," which is the status of an attorney
on the roll of the Court of Appeals of Maryland who elects not to pay
the Client Protection Fund assessment because he or she is not
engaged in the active practice of law in Maryland. Email from
Bedford T. Bentley, Jr., Secretary, State Board of Law Examiners
(May 8, 2007).
MASSACHUSETTS - INACTIVE STATUS
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Article III federal judges are entitled to assume "judicial status"
in registering with the Board of Bar Overseers in Massachusetts.
There is no charge for judicial status. Administrative law judges
generally are not granted judicial status, but they may, and usually
do, assume inactive status, for which they pay half the fee assessed
active lawyers. One may also assume retired status, but a lawyer
wishing to be restored to active status from retired status must pay
the fee applicable to active status for each of the years he or she was
on retired status. SuP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 4:02. Email from Michael
Fredrickson, General Counsel, Board of Bar Overseers (May 10,
2007).
MINNESOTA - INACTIVE STATUS
"Active" status is held by a "lawyer or judge" who has paid the
annual registration fee, is in compliance with the required CLE rules,
is not disbarred, suspended or on permanent disability, etc. SuP. CT.
R. ON LAWYER REGISTRATION, R. 1 A. The Rule also states: "A
lawyer or judge on active status is in good standing and is authorized
to practice law in [Minnesota]." However, in Minnesota as
elsewhere, "a judge shall not practice law." MINN. CODE JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 4 G.
"Inactive status" is available to a lawyer or judge who is retired,
disabled, has limited income as described in the rules, or who "does
not hold judicial office in Minnesota ... and is not engaged in the
practice of law in Minnesota." Id., R. I Cl.
A lawyer or judge on "Inactive Status" is in good standing but is
not "authorized to practice law" in the state. Id., R. 1 B.
"Judge" for purpose of the foregoing rules means any judicial
officer, referee or other hearing officer employed in the judicial
branch of the State of Minnesota." R. 1 C. Since federal ALJs are
not included in the definition of "judge" it would appear that both in
state and out-of-state resident ALJs are eligible for "inactive"
status-assuming, as would be true in virtually every jurisdiction
except possibly Tennessee, that sitting as a federal ALJ is not
engaging in the practice of law. R. 1 C 1, C 4.
A lawyer duly admitted to practice in [Minnesota] may elect
restricted status ...except that a referee or judicial officer of any
court of record of the State of Minnesota or lawyer employed and
serving as attorney or legal counsel for any employer, including any
governmental unit of the State of Minnesota, is not eligible to apply
for restricted status. A lawyer on restricted status shall not be
required to satisfy the educational and reporting requirements of
these Rules.
MINN. R. BD. CON'T LEGAL EDUC. 12 (A).
Someone who chooses 'restricted status' is someone who has
voluntarily chosen not to comply with the CLE educational and
reporting requirements. (see rule 2(K) of the CLE rules). In contrast,
someone who elects to be on 'inactive status' must still meet the
criteria in the definition of 'active status', which includes being in
compliance with the CLE rules. It would, I believe, be incorrect to
suggest that 'restricted status' is equivalent to 'inactive status.'
Comments and citations provided by Kimberly Tolman, Esq.,
Senior Attorney, Minneapolis ODAR.
NEW JERSEY - "PLENARY LICENSEE"*
* The terms "active", "inactive", etc., do not signify legal
classifications in New Jersey. In order to practice law, one must hold
a plenary license to do so and be admitted to the roll of attorneys.
N.J. CT. R. 1:27. (The only category other than "plenary" is the
limited license available (and restricted) to in-house counsel.) Id.
"Every judge, temporary judge and acting judge of a municipal court
shall be a resident of [New Jersey] and an attorney-at-law admitted to
practice in this State . . ." N.J. STAT. § 2B:12-7. There is no state
license requirement for federal ALJs or other federal judges. Every
holder of a plenary license must contribute to the New Jersey
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, an annual assessment. N.J. CT.
R. 1:28. (This includes NJ judges, since neither statute nor rule
exempts them from payment.) In short, all judges, including ALJs,
must pay the annual assessment in order to be in good standing; there
are no out of state exemptions. Communication of Kenneth J.
Bossong, Esq., Director of the New Jersey Fund for Client
Protection.
NEW YORK - RETIRED STATUS
Every attorney admitted to practice in New York, whether
resident or non-resident, and whether or not in good standing, must
file an annual registration statement. 22 N.Y. CODE R. & REGS. §
118.1(a). The attorney must also pay an annual registration fee,
unless he or she certifies that he or she has retired from the practice
of law. Id. at § 118.1(g). The practice of law is defined as giving
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advice or providing representation; full time judges, including ALJs,
are deemed to be retired from the practice of law. Letter of Michael
Colodner, Counsel, State of New York Unified Court System
(February 14, 2006).
OHIO - INACTIVE STATUS
Every attorney who is admitted to the practice of law in Ohio
must register annually and pay a fee. OHIO Gov. BAR. R. VI § 1 (A).
An attorney may be granted inactive status by applying to the
Attorney Registration Section for an exemption from payment of the
registration fee. Id. § 2. An inactive attorney shall not be entitled to
practice law in Ohio; hold himself or herself out as authorized to
practice law in Ohio; hold nonfederal judicial office in Ohio; occupy
a nonfederal position in this state in which the attorney is called upon
to give legal advice or counsel or to examine the law or pass upon the
legal effect of any act, document, or law. Id. The same exemption
applies to a retired attorney, age 65 or older. Id. § 3.
"An ALJ, like other federal attorneys or judges, can be in inactive
status for purposes of the Ohio rule, but is not exempt from CLE
requirements. Ohio has no special provision governing ALJs."
Email from Judge Larry Temin (August 7, 2007).
PENNSYLVANIA - "INACTIVE" STATUS
In Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court exercises exclusive control
over regulation of the legal profession, even to the exclusion of the
legislature (see generally Amanda Irene Figgs, Annual Survey of
Pennsylvania Administrative Law, 14 WIDENER L.J. 553 (2005)), and
the rules with respect to the bar status of ALJs are more or less
impenetrable. Email from Suzanne Price, Attorney Registrar for the
PA Disciplinary Board advises (July 20, 2007).
"On June 29, 1982, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania adopted a policy which interpreted Rule 219(b)
(Pa.R.D.E.) to provide that 'Pennsylvania and Federal Court Justices
and Judges who serve in Courts of record shall be exempt from
payment of the annual assessment.' We are mindful that as a U.S.
Administrative Law Judge you are not permitted to privately practice.
Unfortunately, the Board has consistently denied exemption of
Pa.R.D.E. 219(b) to any person who is not a justice or judge in a court
of record in Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld the Board's interpretation.
"As you may be aware, attorneys may request inactive status for 3
consecutive years, but they must pay the license fee on the 4th year to
avoid having to Petition for Reinstatement. Even though the attorney
may pay the fee and request active status, it does not mean that they
are practicing law, but allows them to practice law if they so desire."
Some ALJ's need to be listed as active because they are not admitted
in any other jurisdiction besides PA and need to be in good standing to
retain their ALJ status.
Members of the judiciary are exempt from CLE during the period
they serve as judges. A member of the judiciary returning to regular
active status shall have no deferred CLE requirement but must
complete the current requirement within twelve (12) months of
returning to active status. PA CLE Judicial Policy Description: If a
judge is not permitted to practice law in a private capacity then they
are eligible for the Judicial Exception. This policy extends to
Administrative Law Judges.
Email from Judge William L. Akers (July 23, 2007).
"First: An 'Inactive' lawyer is Not 'In Good Standing'. Such a
lawyer can obtain a certificate of 'Voluntary Inactive in Lieu of Good
Standing'. Second: ALJs are NOT considered Judicial and must be
either Active or Inactive. Third: If you are Inactive for 3 years or
more, and wish to become 'Active' you must apply for
'Reinstatement' which requires, inter alia., 36 hours of CLE of
which 12 hours must be in Ethics. Administration of the Rules is
done, in part, by The Disciplinary Board of The Supreme Court of
Pennsyvania .... Annual CLE is required of all 'Active' Lawyers.
Only Active Lawyers are able to 'Practice Law' in PA"
TENNESSEE -ACTIVE STATUS
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 20 sets forth the
requirements for active status and exemptions in order to maintain a
license to practice law. Active status is required for all licensed
attorneys who are engaged in the "practice of law" as defined in Rule
9(20.2)(e). "Our Supreme Court's policy is that all judges are within
that definition and therefore must maintain active status with no
applicable exemption." Email from Lance Bracy (May 11, 2007).
VERMONT - EXEMPT
"All judges, whether administrative or not, are exempt from
licensing requirements in the State of Vermont." VT. SUP. CT.
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ADMIN. ORDER 41, § 5. Email from Wendy Collins, Bar Counsel
(May 15, 2007).
C. U. S POSSESSIONS
GUAM -- [no answer to inquiry; presumably active status]
Guam has an integrated bar. "The Bar of Guam is a public body
corporate, the membership of which consists of all persons who are
now and hereafter licensed to practice law in Guam. The members of
the Bar of Guam are officers of the courts of Guam and have
exclusive right to designate themselves as attorneys and counselors,
attorneys at law or lawyers." 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § 9A102. Full
time judges and justices are prohibited from practicing law. 7 GUAM
CODE ANN. § 6110.
NO. MARIANA ISLANDS - [unclear or unsettled; apparently
judicial status]
"An attorney once admitted is deemed 'active,' even if he or she
no longer resides in the Commonwealth, unless the attorney is
disbarred, resigns, or dies." Local Rules of the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
Northern Mariana Islands.
"According to our Director of Courts, bar status of CNMI justices
and judges becomes 'judicial' when confirmed to the bench. Their
status reverts back to 'active' upon retirement or if they are not
retained." Email from Jonathan Grayson, Esq. (September 11, 2007).
Judge Alex R. Munson, U.S. District Court Judge for the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), "said that
when he took the bench he took inactive status in all bar associations
of which he is a member. It was his recollection that federal judges
were required to either go inactive or resign their bar memberships."
Randy Schmidt, Esq., law clerk to Judge Munson.
VIRGIN ISLANDS [no response to inquiry; possibly government
or inactive status]
Integrated bar.
The Virgin Islands Bar shall consist of four classes of members:
active, government, inactive, and honorary.... All attorneys at law
admitted to practice in the courts of the Virgin Islands, except those
admitted pro hac vice, who are domiciled in the Virgin Islands, are
active members of the Virgin Islands Bar .... All attorneys at law
who are not active members of the Virgin Islands Bar, but who have
been specially admitted to practice law in the Virgin Islands on
behalf of the Government of the United States, the Government of
the Virgin Islands, Office of the Public Defender or Legal Services of
the Virgin Islands, shall be eligible to be government members of the
Virgin Islands Bar .... Government members shall pay [reduced]
annual membership dues. . . . All attorneys at law admitted to
practice in the Virgin Islands, except those admitted pro hac vice,
who are domiciled in the Virgin Islands, but who neither maintain a
law office therein nor actively practice law therein in any manner or
to any extent whatsoever, and all attorneys at law admitted to practice
in the Virgin Islands, except those admitted pro hac vice, who cease
to be domiciled in the Virgin Islands, shall cease to be active
members, and those who have filed with the Secretary of the Bar
written notice requesting enrollment in the class of inactive
membership, shall be inactive members.... Inactive members of the
Virgin Islands Bar shall pay [token] annual membership dues....
The judges of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District
Court and the Superior Court, and such persons of distinction as may
be so elected by the membership shall be honorary members of the
Virgin Islands Bar.
V.I. SuP. CT. R. 305.
"An active member of the Bar is an attorney who is admitted to
practice .... who is in good standing, and who actually engages in
the practice of law as authorized." V.I. SuP. CT. R. 306(a). "An
inactive member of the Bar is an attorney who ceases to actively
practice law in the Virgin Islands. . ." V.I. SuP. CT. R. 306(b). "An
inactive member who engages in the active practice of law in any
form while on inactive status shall be subject to the contempt powers
of the court and (other disciplinary action)." V.I. SuP. CT. R.
306(b)(2). "An inactive member of the Virgin Islands Bar in good
standing" can be reinstated to active status. V.I. SuP. CT. R.
306(b)(4).
PUERTO RICO -- ACTIVE STATUS
All judges must be active bar members. Judge Ariel Sotolongo
AMERICAN SAMOA - ELIGIBLE FOR HONORARY
STATUS
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Integrated bar. "Section 3. Honorary members: Judges and
distinguished non-resident lawyers may be elected honorary
members." Bylaws of the American Samoa Bar Association. The
roster of honorary members includes an administrative law judge.
